Trump pledged a quick end to the Iran war, but the reality is far more unstable. On Feb. 28, 2026, Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran, was assassinated by joint forces of Israel and the United States. Since then, the conflict has continued through waves of U.S. attacks, Iranian retaliation, and mounting fears of a broader regional escalation. As of April 8, 2026, the two sides have not reached a final peace settlement. Instead, they only entered a two-week ceasefire arrangement, under which the United States agreed to suspend military strikes, and Iran agreed to halt retaliatory actions and restore navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. Yet the core disputes behind the conflict have not been resolved, and further negotiations are still required. Why is it taking so long?
This is where Washington’s domestic politics becomes crucial. Republicans and Democrats are not “using” the war in the same way, but both parties clearly understand its political value. For Republicans, the war is first and foremost a question of preserving presidential authority. Trump remains the central leader of the Republican Party, and Republicans in Congress have largely defended his freedom to continue military action by invoking national security, the president’s role as commander in chief, and the claim that these strikes are limited rather than open-ended. Yet because Republicans control Washington, they also bear the growing burden of paying for the war. As costs rise and Congress faces pressure to approve new funding under the timeline imposed by the 1973 War Powers Resolution, the G.O.P. must defend not only Trump’s authority, but also the war’s expanding price, uncertain goals, and the internal divisions it is beginning to expose within the party. If Congress does not approve the action, all military operations must be terminated after 60 days. (The president can, however, invoke a 30-day extension).
War creates an opportunity to reinforce executive power and present Trump as a decisive leader. This leaves Republicans in a difficult position: they benefit when Trump looks strong, but they risk severe damage if the war drags on, expands, or produces visible economic pain at home. Polls have shown that about six-in-ten Americans (61 percent) disapprove of Trump’s handling of the conflict. If the situation gets worse, the war could give the president a reason to claim more emergency powers. It could also weaken Congress’s ability to check and limit presidential action. In the name of crisis, the executive branch could keep pushing beyond its normal boundaries. The Twenty-Second Amendment still clearly prohibits any person from being elected president more than twice, but the constant testing of institutional boundaries is itself a dangerous warning sign for the American constitutional order.
Democrats, by contrast, are not best understood as wanting the war itself to continue. Their public position has been to challenge Trump’s legal authority to sustain the conflict without stronger congressional authorization. Democrats have denounced Trump’s actions while pushing war powers measures. Several Democratic leaders, including former Vice President Kamala Harris, have explicitly described the conflict as a “war of choice,” borrowing the same language American politicians have often used to criticize Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Yet even if Democrats do not want the war to continue militarily, they do have an obvious political incentive to let its consequences continue to unfold in the public sphere. The economic strain becomes a powerful campaign tool as the price of oil still remains much higher than pre-war levels. If the ceasefire collapses, or if Trump is seen as having overreached constitutionally, Democrats can use all of that to damage Republicans in the midterm elections.
As the war continues past 40 days, both parties are already trying to convert the conflict into a domestic advantage. Republicans want to preserve Trump’s room for action in the name of national security and executive authority. Democrats want the legal, economic, and political costs of Trump’s war to remain attached to him and his party. In the end, the greatest danger of the U.S.-Iran war may not be only what happens on the battlefield, but what happens in American politics.
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