Amid extreme party polarization in the United States, there’s one foreign policy tool bridging representatives from across the aisle: economic sanctions.
Democrats favor the policy because it aligns with their premise of upholding liberal values, the rule of law, and human rights — it keeps American hands clean of direct violence and boots on the ground. Instead, the “humane” approach has been deemed to be manipulating foreign actors economically, thus incentivizing them to conduct policy in ways that align with the United States’ broader global ambitions.
Even Republicans have been able to take a break from their long-term relationship with free trade and open markets to flirt with economic sanctions.
The severance of financial relations and trade with a state, group, or individual has been the preferred method of achieving foreign policy initiatives by the U.S. since the end of the Cold War. As reported by the Council on Foreign Relations, “The United States uses economic and financial sanctions more than any other country,” most notably against Russia, Iran, Cuba, and North Korea, which are comprehensively sanctioned. Additionally, the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Libya, Sudan, Yemen, and Syria — among many others — face varying degrees of constraining economic sanctions.
Negative Impacts
It is no coincidence that the poorest and least “developed” countries are the same ones that have been suffocated by sanctions for decades. Despite widespread support for this policy among Democrats and Republicans, it’s imperative to assess its on-the-ground impacts.
- Collective Punishment
One report from the Center for Economic and Policy Research found that sanctions, which restricted governments’ access to foreign exchange, “affected the ability of states to provide essential public goods and services.” Sanctions also deprive “revenue for … imports, including … food, medicines, medical equipment, and other necessities.” Sanctions are intended to alter government policy resulting from the negative impacts officials face from their implementation. Instead, authoritarian leaders often evade these intended harmful impacts, rendering the sanctions ineffective in achieving their supposed goal. Though some argue that humanitarian exceptions supplement for the loss of resources upon the implementation of sanctions, these exceptions are often not made, and in cases where they are, they still fail to adequately support civilians. Ultimately, civilians bear the cost. Economic sanctions, especially those that are comprehensive, ought to be considered a method of collective punishment, a tool that liberal Democrats have historically opposed.
- Forced Isolationism
One of the best indicators for gauging global peace is the degree of states’ economic interdependence. One paper found that “capital interdependence contributes to peace independent of the effects of trade, democracy, interest, and other variables.” The more states participate in the global economic market, the less likely they are to engage in acts of warfare because the benefits they receive from economic trade and their mutual dependence on the global scale outweigh any gains they’d receive from engaging in war.
Sanctions, especially those which are extraterritorial, isolate and ostracize parties not only economically, but also politically, culturally, and diplomatically. This relationship strips away the possibility of conflict resolution via diplomacy, lowering the threshold for the escalation of conflicts. Parties are more willing to come to the table if they are not demonized on the global stage. Respect, multilateralism, and diplomacy can be attained without legitimizing the actions of a repressive government, as demonstrated by the United Nations General Assembly.
Lastly, forced isolationism resulting from sanctions often leads to anti-American sentiment and alliances that Republicans have historically sought to dismantle. Republicans’ support of sanctions is incompatible with this long-held goal of promoting a positive image of the U.S. abroad.
Ineffectiveness
If the harms of economic sanctions are not sufficient a rationale for states to seek alternative foreign policy methods, perhaps learning of their ineffectiveness and direct harms is enough to halt their usage.
- Success Rate & Economic Losses
One study found that “since 1970, unilateral U.S. sanctions have achieved foreign policy goals in only 13 percent of the cases where they have been imposed,” while simultaneously costing the U.S. $15 billion to $19 billion annually in potential exports or 200,000 or more jobs lost in the export sector. This research also suggested that “even limited sanctions, such as restrictions on foreign aid or narrowly defined export sanctions, can have surprisingly large effects on bilateral trade flows.” Though recent party schisms have altered this long-held doctrine, the Republican Party once adhered to the capitalist principles of free trade and market economies. In place of this tradition, party members have subscribed to the notion of bringing jobs back to the U.S. to curb economic downturns. It therefore seems counterintuitive that Republicans continue to favor this tool of coercion, which reduces American jobs, contributes to financial loss, and above all, is largely ineffective.
- Regime Change and Foreign Policy Failures
Many Democrats propose that they do not mind footing the economic losses from imposing economic sanctions because these measures are largely about spreading liberalism abroad, a value that is weighed above marginal economic losses. Pressuring authoritarian regimes to democratize or artificially inducing a revolution are some of the effects liberals hope to achieve when instrumentalizing sanctions as a means to spread their desired policy. Cuba, Iran, and Syria, among others, have been sanctioned for over two decades under the presumption that doing so would yield regime change. Yet, except for Syria (where there are now prospects for a democracy, though not resulting from sanctions), little can be said about these states adopting liberal democracy resulting from sanctional pressure. If anything, the slapping of sanctions has increased corruption and authoritarian practices as a result of the leadership’s effort to evade sanctions.
Moreover, the premise that a regime change can be instigated through external coercion lends itself to falling under the guise of neo-imperialism, whereby foreign powers are legitimized in their aims to influence the operations of other governments for their own self-interests. Motive is important to this framework, as representatives may not always pursue regime change out of genuine concern for the people of Iran, Cuba, or Syria, but often because replacing anti-Western leaders aligns with U.S. strategic objectives.
In Defense of Sanctions
I concede that there are ways of making sanctions more humane without rendering the concept obsolete. Creating humanitarian exceptions and allowing the entry of necessities would be examples of this. “Smart Sanctions,” the targeting of specific individuals or military personnel, rather than a whole state, is another method that could prove to be effective. The formation of sanction oversight committees by neutral parties is another tactic to make sanctions more humane.
Independent of these prospects for sanction reform, policymakers should have at the forefront of their mind that sanctions maintain only a 13 percent success rate. They should also not be used with the intention of instigating regime change, as bottom-up revolutions driven by individuals’ agency are, arguably, the most effective means to achieve changes in governance.
Underlying Rationale for Continued Implementation
As simplistic as it would be to say that Democrats and Republicans are ill-informed about the outcomes of sanctions, hence their continued imposition despite research on their harms and ineffectiveness, this is not the case. So, why does the U.S. continue to use economic sanctions as a means to supposedly achieve foreign policy objectives?
I argue that economic sanctions are not a tool of international relations as much as the result of failed diplomacy. A representative voting to implement sanctions signals to voters that their officials are taking action and therefore care about improving circumstances abroad. However, not all action is effective, as has been demonstrated throughout this piece. Sanctions do not cease the rule of repressive regimes or the spread of democracy. Instead, they fail to achieve U.S. objectives 87 percent of the time while simultaneously harming civilians and the American Economy — results both Democrats and Republicans should object.
Ultimately, sanctions are a way for officials to act as though they are doing something about a problem so their polls are boosted, securing their re-election without having to spend any out-of-pocket resources on actually implementing structural, multilateral, or humanitarian change abroad. If the government genuinely cared about improving the lives of civilians abroad, it would act in ways that genuinely exhibited results: increased diplomacy, humanitarian aid, investment, and aiding governmental reform when asked by consensus.
When people claim there’s no common ground between Democrats and Republicans, I would push back: both parties have eagerly backed economic sanctions ostensibly to advance American interests, despite knowing these policies harm vulnerable communities abroad and cost Americans billions in export revenue and jobs.
The Zeitgeist aims to publish ideas worth discussing. The views presented are solely those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of the editorial board.
